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ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE
While the court viewed this privilege as
necessary to maintain the quality and independence of agency decision-making, it
ordered the disclosure of the three documents on remand unless the Air Force
could meet its burden by sufficient demonstration of the applicability of the privilege to this situation. Agreeing that the
documents were products of the attorneyclient relationship, the court, however,
refused to hold them exempt under the
privilege absent a showing by the Air
Force that one document was confidential
in itself and that two others were based on
confidential information provided by the
client. In the first case, one document
sought to be withheld was known and disclosed to parties outside of the attorneyclient relationship (West Publishing Co.);
as to the other two the Air Force sought
to protect under the privilege theory, it
was found that they were not based on information "supplied by the Air Force with
the expectation of secrecy." Id. at 14-18.

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
(Internal Memoranda)
This privilege turns on the distinction
between information which is essentially
factual and documents involving deliberation and policy-making. The Supreme
Court held that the former requires disclosure, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 72
(1973), while documents revealing agency policy making and deliberative processes may be withheld. Id. at 19-20.
Of the four documents the Air Force
sought to withhold under this privilege,
one was found to be exempt from disclosure. As to two others, the court stated
that its policy of "promoting the free flow
of ideas" protected from disclosure those
parts of the documents reflecting the
opinions of Air Force employees concerning the status of negotiations with West.
Slip op. at 22. The court found that the
fourth document, dealing with various
offers and counter-offers by both West
and the Air Force, was not exempt simply
because it reflected "negotiating positions" prior to a final contract. While such
deliberations within an agency structure

are protected, those involving an outside
party are not. The court remanded to
compel disclosure of this document and
any parts of the others dealing with
specific negotiations with West. Id. at
22-24.

SEGREGABILITY
The court went on to hold that the Air
Force had not adequately justified its
claim that the requested documents contained no non-exempt information that
could be ·"reasonably segregable" from
that information the Air Force asserted to
be privileged under exemption five. The
court further directed that an agency is required to provide an adequate description
of a document's content and its reasons
for belieVing the information to be nonsegregable before refUSing to disclose. Id.
at 2.
"The focus of the FOIA is information,
not documents, and an agency cannot
justify withholding an entire document
simply by showing it contains some exempt material." Slip op. at 27-28.
On remand, the Air Force was ordered
to provide a detailed justification for withholding the seven documents. In addition,
the court stated that a further requirement
of a party asserting that the information in
a document was not segregable from exempted information is a description of the
portion of information contained in a file
that is non-exempt and how that information is dispersed throughout the entire
document. The court reasoned that this
information would better enable a court
to establish the validity of an agency's
assertion that non-privileged information
was not segregable from that which was
exempt. Id. at 29-30, 34.

A narrow construction of exemption
five places it in its proper context. For the
attorney-client privilege to possess any
gravity it must be circumscribed to protect communication between the lawyer
and her client which is made with reliance
on secrecy. The expectation of confidentiality is often a condition precedent to
any communication at all. Where parties'
deliberations are protected to permit the
"free flow of ideas" without threat of disclosure, opinion making and discussion
flourishes. In the agency milieu, however,
that crucial expectation of confidentiality
is limited. Where attorney-client consultations demand secrecy in order to
meet an objective, and where administrative deliberations must be confidential to
avoid a chill on the "free flow of ideas,"
the exemption shall apply. Not intended
by the Congress was protection of the
mundane communication within the agency context, information necessarily subject to examination by third parties or the
frustration of the public's reasonable right
to access to information of its government.

Prejudicial
Joinder
by John Jeffrey Ross

John Lee McKnight was arrested and
accused of committing four robberies
within the same area of Baltimore during
a single month in 1974. After an unsuccessful motion to sever the informations
joined in a single prosecution under Mary-
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land Rule 734 (now Rule 745A),
McKnight was convicted. on five counts in
all and the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed. McKnight v. State, 33 Md. App.
280, 364A.2d 116 (1976). Even though
evidence on each information would not
be admissible in a separate trial of
another, the Court upheld joinder because
of the "similarity of circumstances and of
the conduct of" McKnight in the alleged
offenses. 33 Md. App. at 285-86, 364
A.2d at 119. See generally, Ross v. State,
276 Md 664, 670, 350 A.2d 680, 684
(1976); McCormick, Evidence sec. 190
(2d Ed. 1972).
After granting certiorari, the Court of
Appeals reversed. McKnight v. State, 280
Md. 604, 375 A.2d 552 (1977).
The issues involved in the joinder or
severance of indictments or charges demonstrate an essential dichotomy between
the rights of the people and those of the
accused.
As in pretrial release, for example,
where the right to a reasonable opportunity for liberty of the defendant conflicts with the State's interest in protecting the community (see 23 D.C. Code sec.
1303-13), joinder of indictments in one
prosecution for the sake of efficient administration of justice collides with the
prejudicial effects on a defendant facing a
multiplicity of charges.
In his appeal McKnight claimed that the
charges were misjoined, resulting in substantial prejudice to his defense. Concerning relief from prejudicial joinder, Rule
735 (since the trial, Rule 735 has been
superseded by Rule 745 (e)) relevantly
provides:
If it appears that an accused.
. will
be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses
. in an indictment, or by joinder for
trial together, the Court may order an
election or separate trials of counts,
. or provide such other relief justice
requires.
Rule 735 and its descendant, Rule 745
are based in the common law.

(c),

McKnight, supra., 280 Md. at 608, 375
A.2d at 554; DiNatale v. State, 8 Md.
App. 455, 260 A.2d 669 (1970). Similar

in tenor to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, they provide for the
application of judicial discretion to sever
misjoined counts if necessary.

~

THE FORUM

There is considerable commentary on
the problems of misjoining charges,
especially the danger where the evidence
necessary to prove each is mutually exclusive. Joinder can be considered prejudicial per se. In Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554, 653 (1967), the Supreme Court
stated:
All joint trials, whether of several codefendants or of one defendant charged
with multiple offenses, furnish inherent
opportunities for unfairness when evidence submitted as to one crime .
may influence the jury as to a totally
different charge.
See also 8 Moore's Federal Practice,
14.04(1);

~

See generally, Walsh, Fair

Trials and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 49 A.B.A.J. 853, 856-857

(1963); 1 Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Sec. 223, p. 441 n. 32. Only
when the interest in trial economy outweighs the prejudice to a defendant
should a joinder be permitted. As Professor Wright notes, however, this balancing
of interests is a dangerous practice to
follow when a due process right is involved. He states in his Federal Practice
and Procedure in Sec. 141 at Pp.
305-306:
Justice and fairness should control over
the demands of efficiency. Given the
evident reluctance of trial and appellate
courts to grant separate trials under
Rule 14 [the pattern for Maryland Rule
745 (e), McKnight, Supra, 280 Md at
608, 375 A.2d at 554], a broad interpretation of Rule 8 [Md Rule 745(a)]
means broad joinder, whether or not
this is just or fair. ***(I)t is a novel
doctrine that the right of an accused to
a fair trial can be balanced against competing considerations of efficiency.***it
seems strange indeed that one
presumably innocent may be made to
undergo something less than a fair trial,
or that he may be prejudiced in his
defense if the prejudice is "not substantial", merely to serve the convenience
of the prosecution.
In noting the analogy between the
Maryland and Federal rules in this regard,
the Court of Appeals in McKnight listed as
three possibilities for prejudice (articulated in Drew v. United States, 11.8 U.S.
App. D.C. 11, 14-15, 331 F.2d 85,88-89
(1964)): 1) potential to embarrass or confound the defense; 2) the danger that "the
jury may cumulate the evidence of the
various crimes charged and find guilt

when, if the offenses were considered separately, it would not do" so and 3) the
jury may incorrectly, from evidence of
one charge, make an unfair inference of
criminal disposition in another. 280 Md.
at 609, 375 A.2d at 554-555. See, Simmons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 165-166,
167 A.60, 64 (1933).
The court pointed to two lines of
authority on relief from prejudicial joinder
when the evidence as to each offense
would not be mutually admissible at separate trials. The first rule allows joinder of
offenses when the government can present its case(s) without confUSing the jury.
It is theorized that a clear and distinct presentation of each count at trial will result
in a separate jury consideration of each.
This is eminently unrealistic and therefore
the court followed the more stringent
theory that "a severance should be ordered where there has been a joinder of
similar but unrelated offenses, if the evidence as to each crime would not be
mutually admissible at separate trials."
280 Md at 610, 375 A.2d at 555. The
court thus joins the Fourth circuit in noting there is the potential for a serious
misapplication by the jury of a finding of
guilt on one charge as probative of a defendant's guilt on another. This danger
may occur even when the jury is presented with "Simple and Distinct"
charges. 280 Md. at 611, 375 A.2d at
555; United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d
733, 738 n.5 (4th Cir. 1976).
In addition to rejecting the Government's contention, which the Court of
Special Appeals sanctioned, that the
offenses were so identical in nature as to
point to one man as their author the court
saw no merit in the fact that the trial
judge gave instructions designed to caution the jury to consider each charge separately. McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375
A.2d at 557. Instructions simply cannot
overcome prejudice. The jury cannot
erase its memory as it proceeds to consider each separated offense.
As Justice Jackson stated in a celebrated passage from Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.s. 440, 453 (1949): "The
naive assumption that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by instructions to the
all practicing lawyers know to
jury .
be unmitigated fiction."

